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Abstract
Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two
agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions
in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike
Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are
sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems,
while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.
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1 Introduction
This model is concerned with voluntary contribution to the provision of a con-
tinuous public good. Since Warr (1982, 1983) many scholars have analysed these
contribution games where free riding problems are pervasive, and public goods
are underprovided in equilibrium (Cornes and Sandler, 1984; Bergstrom et al.,
1986).
Our main reference is the complete information contribution game by Var-
ian (1994) -henceforth Varian- where two contributors have quasi—linear utility,
the marginal evaluations of the public good are ordered and contribution can
be sequential or simultaneous. Varian shows that free riding is normal in the
simultaneous and sequential frameworks, and that the equilibrium public good
provision is never higher if players contribute sequentially rather than simulta-
neously.
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In the simultaneous case the player with higher evaluation of the public good
is the only contributor, while in the sequential case the amount of public good
provided is even less because the first mover could have an incentive to shift the
burden of providing the public good onto the follower.
This result has been further investigated by variations of the original frame-
work and has even been tested experimentally (Falkinger et al., 2000; Gächter
et al., 2010). Buchholz et al (1997) consider the case in which the players can
exchange monetary compensations after a sequential contribution. Vesterlund
(2003) points out the importance of the informational value in a sequential
fund raising and, more recently, Bag and Roy (2011) compare sequential and
simultaneous contributions with incomplete information. Andreoni (1998) finds
interesting results by introducing altruism in public good provision.
In our model we consider an aspect that has not yet been covered in the lit-
erature but is relevant in several cases. Namely the possibility that contributors
have different targets for the optimal level of the public good to be provided
(examples include international or federal deals on carbon emissions, immigra-
tion quotas, exchange rates, and even tax harmonization). In our model this is
depicted by introducing a quadratic loss function in the contribution game.
The existence of conflicting targets in the absence of an authority able to
enforce contribution is common in international negotiations.
We consider two agents (C and L) who decide whether to contribute to
the joint production of a public good. C and L have different resources and
different targets, and we compare the outcomes when contribution is sequential
or simultaneous. Although information is complete and symmetric, we find that
heterogeneity in the players’ targets can easily prevent contribution. Unlike
Varian, joint contribution occurs only if the players’ preferences are not too
different. In addition, in contrast to Varian, joint contribution is more likely
under the sequential regime. However, total contribution is unambigously higher
in the simultaneous game (no matter who is the leader).
The paper is organised as follows: the next section introduces our model,
Section 3 presents the results for both the simultaneous and sequential setups.
Section 4 is devoted to compare the equilibrium contributions under the different
institutional frameworks and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our model must depict some basic issues: there exist a conflict over the fund-
ing of a public good; players may have different targets and different costs in
raising the resources necessary to produce the public good; nobody is forced to
cooperate.
The following contribution game includes all of these points.
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2.1 Production of the public good
A convenient way to summarize our idea is by describing the public good as an
output produced through the resources C and L are willing to spend in order
to achieve their targets.
We define gL and gC the contributions by L and C respectively. Let M be
the quantity of public good produced according to a linear technology:
M = M¯ + d(gL + gC) 0 < d < 1; (1)
Where M¯ ≥ 0 is the pre-existing level of the public good. This kind of
production function fits the idea that the amount of public good is proportional
to the resources used1 .
2.2 Payoffs
We assume that each player has a quadratic loss function with respect to his own
target, and bears a quadratic cost to collect the resources needed to produce
the public good2 . As a consequence, utilities are
Uj = −
1
2
(M −M∗j )
2
−
πj
2
g2j (2)
j = C, L; πC = 1; πL > 1 (3)
where πL > 1 means that for L it is relatively costly to gather the resources
needed to produce the public good. Cost asymmetry is assumed for sake of
generality.
Finally, we assume M¯ < M∗C and M¯ < M
∗
L.
By substituting (1) into (2) and (3) we can rewrite the payoffs:
Uj = −
1
2
(M¯ + d(gL + gC)−M
∗
j )
2
−
πj
2
g2j (4)
In Table 1 we present the equilibrium contributions under sequential and
simultaneous decisions. In the sequential case both C and L could have the
leadership.
Table 1
C leader L leader Simultaneous
g∗C =
∆C(πL+d
2)πLd−πLd
3∆L
π2
L
d2+(πL+d2)2
g∗∗C =
∆C(d
2+πL+πLd
2)d−d3∆L
d2+πL(1+d2)2
g˜C =
∆C(πL+d
2)d−d3∆L
d2+πL+πLd2
g∗L =
∆L(πL+d
2+πLd
2)d−πLd
3∆C
π2
L
d2+(πL+d2)2
g∗∗L =
∆L(1+d
2)d−d3∆C
d2+πL(1+d2)2
g˜L =
∆L(1+d
2)d−d3∆C
d2+πL+πLd2
where ∆C ≡ (M
∗
C − M¯) and ∆L ≡ (M
∗
L − M¯).
1 Linearity is useful to obtain closed-form solutions with no loss of generality.
2 Gathering real resources always generates costs: for a country they can be the political
costs of raising taxes, or even the opportunity costs of diverting funds from alternative projects.
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By observing the outcomes summarized in Table 1, it is evident that in all
cases the contribution of C is decreasing with respect to ∆L, and the contribu-
tion of L is decreasing with respect to ∆C .
Intuitively, if L prefers more public good relative to C, the latter could have
an incentive to free ride should L produce enough for both players. This conveys
the essential insight that, in order to achieve joint contribution, the targets M∗C
and M∗L must not be too different. This result has crucial consequences that we
are going to discuss in the rest of the paper.
3 Positivity conditions for the equilibrium con-
tributions
In Table 2 we report the conditions under which equilibrium contributions are
positive.
Table 2
C leader L leader Simultaneous
∆C
∆L
> d
2
πL+d2
∆C
∆L
> d
2
d2+πL+πLd2
∆C
∆L
> d
2
d2+πL
∆C
∆L
< πL+d
2+πLd
2
πLd2
∆C
∆L
< 1+d
2
d2
∆C
∆L
< 1+d
2
d2
The conditions that assure a positive contribution by both players in the
different games are summarized in Figure 1.
By simple inspection of the previous conditions we can write the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 (Positivity conditions for the individual contributions): equilib-
rium contributions are both positive if and only if the individual targets are not
too different. The admissible difference is broader in the sequential game.
Proof. see the appendix.
These results depart from Varian in two respects. Firstly, Varian argues that
free riding occurs when preferences are similar. Secondly, in Varian sequentiality
can exacerbate free riding problems -a leader with higher marginal utility from
the public good might be better off by not contributing and free riding on the
follower. Both these outcomes are reversed in our model.
The first departure happens because the initial level of public good is below
the target for both players, and free riding is convenient only if one player’s
contribution saturates the other player’s utility. This is possible when the tar-
gets M∗C and M
∗
L are quite different. When targets are close, a single player’s
contribution is never sufficient to achieve the other player’s target.
We see the second departure because the leader does not contribute if and
only if his target is sufficiently low relative to the follower. If this is not the
case, the only way to exploit the leadership is to try to set the contribution at
a level that pushes the follower to add his own contribution.
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As a consequence, contributions will be both positive under a wider difference
in the individual targets (see Figure 1).
4 Sequential decisions vs. simultaneous deci-
sions
4.1 Total contribution
In this section we restrict our attention to the cases in which both contribu-
tions are positive in equilibrium. It is straightforward to conclude that total
contribution is higher in the simultaneous regime.
Proposition 2 (Total contribution ranking): when both contributions are pos-
itive, total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.
Proof. See the appendix.
The proposition states that the simultaneous game dominates the sequen-
tial game in terms of total contribution no matter who is the leader. Unlike
proposition 1, this result is in line with Varian 3 .
Proposition 1 and proposition 2 convey our most important result, namely
that the simultaneous game increases total contribution, but it requires more
stringent conditions in order to obtain joint contribution.
In other words, the simultaneous framework is successful in increasing total
contribution given that players are willing to contribute, while the sequential
framework is successful in inducing contribution.
In addition, we must stress that the simplest way to obtain some contribution
from a reluctant player is to have it act as a follower in the sequential game. In
fact, from Proposition 1 we know that the leader tries to set his own contribution
at a level that pushes the follower to contribute as well.
4.2 Individual contribution
We now compare the individual contributions within the different regimes.
Again, we consider only the case of joint contribution.
Our first conclusion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium contributions in the sequential game): in the se-
quential game the leader contributes more than the follower.
Proof. See the appendix.
This result is important because it allows us to know unambigously who
provides the higher contribution.
In the next proposition we compare the individual contributions in the si-
multaneous game:
3 We also have (g∗
C
+ g∗
L
) ≥ (g∗∗
C
+ g∗∗
L
) when ∆C
∆L
≤
πL(1+d
2)+d2(2+d2)
πL(1+2d2)+d2(1+d2)
.
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Proposition 4 (Equilibrium contributions in the simultaneous game): in the
simultaneous game C contributes more than L if ∆C∆L >
1+2d2
πL+2d2
and viceversa.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand this proposition, suppose that costs are symmetric, i.e. πL =
1. In such a case, the condition ∆C∆L >
1+2d2
πL+2d2
boils down to ∆C > ∆L. Hence,
when the cost of gathering the resources necessary to produce the public good
is the same, the player who desires more public good contributes more. When
πL is larger than unity this condition is relaxed: we have g˜C > g˜L if ∆C >(
1+2d2
πL+2d2
)
∆L, with
(
1+2d2
πL+2d2
)
< 1.
In other words, C observes that L bears a higher cost, and, if πL is sufficiently
high C is going to contribute more than L even though ∆C < ∆L.
5 Conclusions
Our simple model has several implications for public goods provision in the
presence of different targets. In contrast to Varian, loss functions imply that
joint contribution occurs only if players’ targets are close enough, and that
heterogeneity in the preferences over the optimal level of the public good is
a major cause of free riding. The sequential framework reduces the free rider
problem because the leader tries to push the follower to contribute. However,
total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.
We conclude that when payoffs can be conveniently represented through a
loss function there exists a trade-off -a simultaneous framework obtains higher
total contribution when players have similar targets, but a sequential framework
may obtain joint contribution when targets are very different.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In the simultaneous game both contributions are positive when
d2
πL + d2
<
∆C
∆L
<
1 + d2
d2
. (5)
In the sequential game (C leader) both contributions are positive when
d2
πL + d2
<
∆C
∆L
<
d2 + πL + πLd
2
d2
(6)
since 1+d
2
d2
< d
2+πL+πLd
2
d2
, the interval of ∆C∆L under which both contributions
are positive is wider in the sequential game.
When L is the leader both contributions are positive when
d2
d2 + πL + πLd2
<
∆C
∆L
<
1 + d2
d2
(7)
since d
2
d2+πL+πLd2
< d
2
πL+d2
, the interval of ∆C∆L under which both contributions
are positive is wider in the sequential game.
Proof of Proposition 2
We want to prove that (g˜C + g˜L) > (g
∗
C + g
∗
L). Thus, we have to verify that
d(πL∆C +∆L)
πL + d2 + πLd2︸ ︷︷ ︸
simultaneous
>
d(π2L∆C +∆L(πL + d
2))
π2Ld
2 + (πL + d2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
sequential, C leader
(8)
Condition (8) boils down to
∆C
∆L
>
d2
πL + d2
.
We want to prove that (g˜C + g˜L) > (g
∗∗
C + g
∗∗
L ). We have to verify that
d(πL∆C +∆L)
πL + d2 + πLd2︸ ︷︷ ︸
simultaneous
>
d∆C(πL + πLd2) + d∆L
d2 + πL(1 + d2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
sequential, L leader
(9)
which boils down to
∆C
∆L
<
1 + d2
d2
.
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hence, (g˜C + g˜L) > (g
∗
C + g
∗
L) when
∆C
∆L
> d
2
πL+d2
and (g˜C + g˜L) > (g
∗∗
C + g
∗∗
L )
when ∆C∆L <
1+d2
d2
. These conditions coincide with the values of ∆C∆L assuring
the positivity of both contributions in the simultaneous framework. Thus, the
proposition holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
We want to prove that the leader contributes more than the follower. With
C leader, we set g∗C ≥ g
∗
L :
∆C(πL + d2)πLd− πLd3∆L
π2Ld
2 + (πL + d2)2
≥
∆L(πL + d2 + πLd2)d− πLd3∆C
π2Ld
2 + (πL + d2)2
(10)
by rearranging condition (10) we obtain
∆C
∆L
≥
πL + d
2 + 2πLd
2
πL + 2πLd2
since
d2
πL + d2
<
πL + d2 + 2πLd2
πL + 2πLd2
<
πLd
2 + d2 + πL
πLd2
we conclude that, when both contributions are positive, g∗C > g
∗
L.
With L leader, we set g∗∗L ≥ g
∗∗
C :
∆L(1 + d2)d− d3∆C
d2 + πL(1 + d2)2
≥
∆C(d2 + πL + πLd2)d− d3∆L
d2 + πL(1 + d2)2
. (11)
By rearranging condition (11) we obtain
∆C
∆L
≤
1 + 2d2
πL + πLd2 + 2d2
;
since
d2
d2 + πL + πLd2
<
1 + 2d2
πL + πLd2 + 2d2
<
1 + d2
d2
we conclude that, when both contributions are positive, g∗∗L > g
∗∗
C .
Proof of Proposition 4
To compare the individual contributions we set g˜C ≥ g˜L :
∆C(πL + d
2)d− d3∆L
d2 + πL + πLd2
≥
∆L(1 + d
2)d− d3∆C
d2 + πL + πLd2
. (12)
By rearranging condition (12) we obtain
∆C
∆L
≥
πL + 2d2
1 + 2d2
.
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